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Neighbourhood Europeanization Trough ENP 
The Case of Ukraine
Andrea Gawrich, Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert
University Duisburg-Essen / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel
Abstract
We contribute to the literature of European Studies by introducing the approach of Neighbourhood 
Europeanization. Based on insights from Membership and Enlargement Europeanization, we reveal 
important inconsistencies of Neighbourhood Europeanization through the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) as well as a lack of robust empirical support for its effectiveness. We also define core dimensions and 
determinants of Neighbourhood Europeanization and implement this analytical framework for the case 
of Ukraine. Our analysis clearly demonstrates substantial asymmetries in the ENP for Ukraine across three 
dimensions we chose – democracy promotion, economic cooperation, and Justice and Home Affairs, which 
clearly reflect the inconsistency of the ENP concept, that is top-down formulation of EU interests combined 
with weak conditionality. However, our analysis shows that despite Ukraine’s growing frustration because 
of the lack of a membership perspective, there is a lot of room for keeping up Ukraine’s motivation for 
Europeanization reforms.  Especially, widening and strengthening the linkage-mechanisms would allow to 
overcome ENP inconsistency and to improve the effectiveness of Neighborhood Europeanization. 
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1.  Introduction - The External Dimension of Europeanization1 
Theoretical and empirical research on neighbourhood policies is not yet well rooted in the literature on 
Europeanization. The concept of Europeanization was introduced during the early 1990s and has, by now, 
become a rather fashionably and widely deployed research tool amongst scholars from International 
Relations, European Studies and Comparative Government traditions alike (see e.g. Axt et al. 2007). 
However, being still a relatively young research field, it has only been recognized at the end of the 1990s 
as a “distinctive research area in EU studies” (Sedelmeier 2006: 4). When reviewing the rapidly growing 
body literature from the early 1990s to the present day, it is possible to identify three distinct phases and 
– consequently – three dimensions of Europeanization research, where each new dimension draws on and 
adds to the previous one:
Membership Europeanization•	 , which delineates the impact of the European Union (EU) on existing EU 
member states, 
Enlargement Europeanization•	 , which applies to accession and candidate countries with a clear EU-
membership perspective, and, more tentatively, what we would label
Neighbourhood Europeanization•	 , which affects the EU’s neighbouring “outsiders”, where there is no 
immediate accession perspective.
As regards Enlargement Europeanization, the adoption of EU rules by transition countries implied “the 
most massive international rule transfer in recent history” (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005). However, 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) incentives may be too limited in order to support domestic drivers of 
institutional reform (Melnykovska/Schweickert 2008; Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006). The recent extensions of 
Europeanization analysis towards EU’s influence on outsiders (Anastasakis 2005; Emerson 2004a; Emerson 
2004b; Emerson 2004c; Emerson 2005; Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 
2004; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005) tries to evaluate this. However, there is still a lack of case studies 
on European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP) and the effects of Neighbourhood Europeanization based on 
precise analytical frameworks. 
In this paper we try to partly fill this gap by providing a case study for Ukraine. The case of Ukraine seems 
to be a natural choice for a first case study because, according to the methodological case categorization 
by Hague/Harrop (1998), we can regard Ukraine as a crucial case among the ENP countries which allows to 
derive country specific as well as more general findings. We regard Ukraine as having best preconditions 
for successful membership in ENP, because of its willingness of cooperation and its regime quality as well 
as its high interest to become an EU member. As Ukraine is the most promising crucial case, we follow this 
most-likely design (George/Bennett 2005) in order to basically understand prospects of Europeanization 
through ENP.
In order to develop an appropriate design for our case study, Section 2 discusses differences and parallels 
between the different types of Europeanization mentioned above, revealing important inconsistencies 
1       A reviewed version of this working paper will be published in ‘Journal of Common Market Studies’ end of 2009/
beginning of 2010. This paper is an output of the ENEPO (EU Eastern Neighbourhood: Economic Potential and 
Future Development) project financed by the EU in the Sixth Framework Program. We are grateful for support 
and helpful comments from Anja Franke, Marietta König and Joachim Koops..
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of Neighbourhood Europeanization through the ENP as well as a lack of robust empirical support for its 
effectiveness. In Section 3, we define the dimensions and determinants of Neighbourhood Europeanization. 
A reviewed version of this working paper will be published in ‘Journal of Common Market Studies’ end 
of 2009/beginning of 2010. This paper is an output of the ENEPO (EU Eastern Neighbourhood: Economic 
Potential and Future Development) project financed by the EU in the Sixth Framework Program. We 
are grateful for support and helpful comments from Anja Franke, Marietta König and Joachim Koops. 
Section 4 implements this analytical framework for the case of Ukraine by explaining the links between 
Europeanization and its determinants. Section 5 summarizes and draws conclusions.
2.  Neighbourhood Europeanization – Can Weak Conditionality Work? 
Concerning Enlargement Europeanization, most empirical evidence seems to support the external incentive 
model which explains the broad pattern of successful rule transfer to the candidate countries. According 
to the rationalist external incentive model, which is seen as EU-driven, the EU offers a combination of 
conditionality and rewards (assistance and institutional ties), although the EU’s conditionality is restricted 
to very low forms of “punishment” that are smaller steps towards integration. Rewards are needed to 
reach the adoption of EU’s rules and they will have to exceed the domestic adoption costs. Nevertheless, 
in this model, success depends on determinacy of conditions, size and speed of rewards, and credibility of 
conditionality (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 664f; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005: 9f). Alternative 
models like social learning and lesson drawing have been regarded as being less important as norm 
and value based parts of Europeanization and were considered as merely supportive (Schimmelfennig 
2007). According to the social learning model, which is based on constructivist assumptions, relevant 
actors internalize values of Europeanization, that is they more or less converged to a common European 
identity. Finally, the lesson drawing model assumes that state-induced reforms and rule adoption take 
place because state actors judge Europeanization as an effective remedy to inherently domestic needs 
and policy challenges. 
This insight from the enlargement literature implies a conceptual challenge for Neighbourhood 
Europeanization, because the EU’s leverage and effectiveness might be severely limited due to the lack 
of attractive incentives. Europeanization without conditionality implies the long-term internalization and 
embedding of European norms and values. Such a process is less based on strategic cost-maximization, 
but instead more on social learning and lesson. In its dealing with non-candidate neighbours, the EU has 
to aim less at exerting ‘leverage’ and instead focus on promoting ‘linkage’, which is, according to Levitsky 
and Way (2006) the density of a country’s tie to countries or bodies such as the USA, the EU and other 
western-led multilateral institutions. (Western) leverage is defined as a (non-Western) government’s 
vulnerability to external pressure.
Hence, Neighbourhood Europeanization has to refer to quite some features of Membership Europeanization. 
Cowles et al. (2001) introduce the notion of ‘goodness of fit’. They explain domestic structural change 
through adaptational pressures, which arise when there is a ‘misfit’ between European and domestic 
policies, processes and institutions. In other words “[o]nly if European policies, institutions and/or 
processes differ significantly from those found at the domestic level, is there any need for member states 
(or accession candidates) to change” (Börzel/Risse 2007: 490). However, having ENP countries in mind, 
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which show an enormous misfit, this approach seems primarily useful for adjustment within the EU. In 
an alternative approach, Radaelli (2003) interprets Europeanization more as an ongoing interactive and 
two-way process and less as a one-way reaction to Brussels. This more overtly constructivist approach to 
Europeanization places additional emphasis on the importance of norms and ideas and foreshadows the 
emphasis on sociological institutionalist takes on Europeanization, which form an important part of the 
enlargement dimension research agenda.2  
The basic features of the three forms of Europeanization are summarized in Table 1 in which we extend 
the framework of Axt et al. (2007). As this table shows, Neighbourhood Europeanization suffers from a 
severe inconsistency. It resembles Enlargement Europeanization in a fairly strong way in its asymmetric 
and top-down orientation. But it has little in common with the possibilities to consume Europeanization, 
the prospect of membership (meaning that gate keeping is the missing mechanism of Europeanization) 
and the level of conditionality. Like in Membership Europeanization rather weak conditionality would 
require learning and lesson drawing and, most importantly, allowing for a two-way approach.  
Table 1 – Three Stages of Europeanization - Parallels and Differences 
Membership  
Europeanization
Accession 
Europeanization
Neighbourhood 
Europeanization
Conditions of 
Europeanization
Producer and 
consumer of 
Europeanization
Strong consumer of 
Europeanization
Weak consumer of 
Europeanization
Consuming 
or designing 
Europeanization?
Two way street:  
Top-down and 
Bottom-up
One-way   street  
(primarily)  
Asymmetric top 
down
One-way street  
Asymmetric top-
down
Mechanisms of 
Europeanization
Large variety of 
direct and indirect 
impacts
Predominantly direct 
impact
Predominantly direct 
impact
Conditionality
High  
(e.g. penalties of 
European Court )
Very high  
gate-keeping for 
membership
Weak  
no gate-keeping for 
membership
Incentives
E.g. to avoid 
penalties by EU Court
EU membership
Closer cooperation 
with the EU and 
some illusions of 
membership
Results
Continuous political 
change, deeply 
routed
Rapid political 
change with 
extensive effects
Continuous political 
change, comparably 
superficial
Source: Based on Axt et al. (2007: 144); own extensions.
2  According to all three forms of Europeanization it seems to be rather widespread to refer to ‘neo-institutiona-
list’ approaches, like for example Schmitt/Caporaso et al. and Knill/Lehmkuhl did (for the debate, see Feathers-
tone 2003: 15 f.).
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Given the lack of a consistent policy strategy, it is rather not surprising that ENP from the outset had to face 
a lot of criticism (see e.g. Lavenex 2004; Stratenschulte 2005). Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2006) regard 
ENP as a policy which “emulates key concepts and routines developed in the context of enlargement – 
ranging from the general conception of negotiated bilateralism to the emphasis on positive conditionality 
– and borrows concrete instruments, such as action plans, enhanced monitoring through regular reports, 
and twinning of public administrations.” (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2006: 143). Furthermore it is based 
on strategic calculations. After Eastern enlargement, the EU realized the risks of new dividing lines at the 
European continent (O’Connell 2008: 116) which should be avoided through convergence of the new 
neighbours towards European standards.
The core problem of ENP is its demanding character without attractive and clear incentives. Its conditionality 
works on a very low level, as the incentive of EU-membership and threats of stopping accession negotiations 
are missing (see e.g. Jahn 2007; Lang 2007; Kempe 2007; Lippert 2007; O’Donnell/Whitman 2007; Rhein 
2007; Kelley 2006: 30). In contrast there are even budgetary constraints and competing priorities within 
the ENP (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2006). Official EU rhetoric tries to downplay the role of membership 
perspective for domestic changes. In a programmatic speech on ‘Wider Europe’, Romani Prodi argued 
that accession must not be “the only game in town”. Although he conceded that the “goal of accession 
is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of”, he also asked, why “a less ambitious 
goal [should] not have some effect?” (Prodi 2002).3  Apart from that, ENP must be characterized as a mix 
of policies focusing, on the one hand, on advantages for the respective countries while, on the other hand, 
obviously following primarily EU’s security and economic interests (for example border policy).
Empirical support for ENP policies is not encouraging either. In contrast to empirical research on 
Enlargement Europeanization, only a few studies analyze the impact of the EU on institutional change by 
means of agreements below a membership perspective. Positive effects of links to the EU may be reached 
via a variety of channels: promotion of democratic attitudes among citizens, political incentives for elites 
(in government and in the opposition), domestic power balance shifts in favour of democratic politicians, 
and promotion of better democratic governance through incentives for public administration reform (Pop-
Eleches 2007). Hence, democracy is promoted by a combination of political conditionality with significant 
political and economic incentives. Di Tommaso et al. (2007), implementing an index of institutional quality 
from the EBRD, confirm a positive impact of basic agreements on the quality of institutions in transition 
countries. 
Our own empirical results shown in Appendix Table A1 are more sceptical. For a panel of 25 transition 
3  The final aim of the ENP cannot be and, in fact, is not total harmonization with the EU’s acquis communau-
taire. What is,     however, expected is a certain level of approximation (see Lavenex et al. 2007). Yet the official 
rhetoric remains diffuse. What makes it so difficult to classify, is the fact that ENP policy is situated somewhere 
between internal and foreign policy (see e.g. Vobruba 2007). On the one hand, the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) until now has been dominated by the member states (therefore not in the hands of the 
Commission except in the case of external trade, development and humanitarian aid policy) and still requires 
consensus. On the other hand, “ENP is also an extension and adaptation of the Commission’s active foreign 
policy role during enlargement. The ENP has largely been conceptualized within DG Enlargement. Only recently 
was it transferred to the External Relations DG. This is consistent with March and Olsen’s [neo-institutionalist]
[…] argument that actors take on roles, which then in turn shape their behaviour” (Kelley 2006: 31). However, 
in the ENP there is a concurrence of EU’s supranational level (commission) and nation state level (ministerial 
council), which is maybe the reason for the inconsistent policy.
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countries we use the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) which, in our view, provides a more 
comprehensive measure of institutional quality. In pooled regressions which account for cross-country 
as well as for time-series aspects, we can confirm a positive impact of EU integration on institutional 
quality. For Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) which are the first step of this integration, 
the improvement of institutions in cooperating countries would lie in the range of about 0.2 which, given 
a standard deviation of 1 for the index, seems to be substantial. However, as shown by the regression 
with effect fixed between countries, that is only considering changes over time (last column), the 
positive impact of EU Integration is not due to improvements of institutional quality over time but rather 
between countries – a grain of salt for too much optimism about institutional change supported by basic 
EU agreements. Interestingly, entry into the accession process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) has a significant effect over time, that is these countries actually improved institutional quality.4 
The ‘carrot’ in this case is regional security rather than economic cooperation. The prospect of NATO 
accession might have a positive effect, which might be comparable to the impact of EU accession (see e.g. 
Schimmelfennig 2007; Pop-Eleches 2007). Hence, the message is that basic EU agreements can provide 
positive incentives for better governance, empirical support for such an optimistic view is rather weak, 
and security issues seem to play an increasing role as an incentive for Neighbourhood Europeanization. All 
in all, given the conceptual inconsistency of the concept of ENP discussed above it seems rather unlikely 
that weak incentives are well-targeted in order to achieve a significant impact on governance in ENP 
countries. 
3.  Europeanization through ENP – In Search of a Concept
In order to test for the effectiveness of ENP policies in neighbouring countries, we develop a concept 
for a qualitative analysis which we apply to the case of Ukraine. First, we show that three dimensions 
of ENP policies have to be distinguished for our purpose. Second, we determine the dependent variable, 
Europeanization through ENP, and the independent variables which might explain the dependent variable. 
Applied to the case of Ukraine, this will reveal the extent to which dependent variables can be linked to 
Europeanization achieved through ENP.
3.1 Dimensions of ENP Policies
As argued above, ENP policies still follow the enlargement blueprint which distinguishes between 
democracy promotion and sectoral cooperation (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 669f). In contrast to 
a comprehensive idea of sectoral cooperation during enlargement, ENP concentrates on specific areas 
which figure high on the EU’s list of priorities embedded to various degrees in country-specific Action Plans 
(APs) (Emerson 2004b). We consider three dimensions of ENP policies which are of essential importance 
for both the quality of Europeanization in Ukraine (Democracy Promotion, Justice and Home Affairs) and 
the EU’s strategic interest (Economic Cooperation, especially trade) (see e.g. Mahncke 2008): 
4 NATO membership and enlargement also received little attention with respect to its potential impact on the 
quality of institutions in transition countries. A few studies discussed NATO impact in terms of economic as-
pects of regional security (see e.g. Sandler/Hartley 1999; Andrei/Teodorescu 2005) and democracy promotion 
(see e.g. Barany 2004; Boonstra 2007; Epstein 2005). A Membership Action Plan (MAP) was approved in NATO’s 
Washington Summit of 1999, demanding a kind of minimum institutional standards.
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Democracy Promotion: The EU sees the ENP as a democratization tool (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). At the 
same time, the EU’s democracy promotion strategies have received plenty of criticism for being badly 
coordinated (Crawford 2000), for following a “one-size-fits-all”-approach (Börzel/Risse 2004), and for being 
biased towards an EU view (Barbé/Johansson-Nogués 2008: 91). Generally, critics argue that there is too 
little bottom-up and, at the same time, inconsistent top-down (e.g. French/Meijenfeldt 2006). Top-down 
instruments are political dialogue and official statements. The EU seeks to improve linkage by such means 
as regular summits, committee meetings and negotiations (Kobzar 2006). An institutionalized dialogue 
is intended to exercise ‘soft power’ on elite mentalities and external policy orientation (Pridham 1999; 
Vachudova 2005: 83; Nye 2004; Pridham 2000; Levitsky/Way 2006). In the same vein, official statements 
can be interpreted as a strategy of ‘blaming and shaming’ (Maier/Schimmelfennig 2007, reference to Smith 
2001, see for this e.g. Zangl 2001). This strategy has various dimensions: EU’s statements on presidential and 
parliamentary elections in ENP states, essential comments in the field rule of law (especially corruption), 
and – borrowing legitimation from others – what we call cross-checking, that is comments on obligations 
imposed by other international bodies like OSCE and Council of Europe. 
Bottom-up strategies should support non-state actors and those institutions, not belonging to high level 
politics, that is civil society, the education system, and the media. Concerning the civil society and the 
education system, ENP offers financial support through TACIS/EIDHR and TEMPUS respectively. While 
TACIS refers to infrastructural help and EIDHR to bottom-up democracy promotion, TEMPUS is regarded 
to help with higher education modernization, people-to-people-contacts among European students and, 
thus, linkage between East and West (see e.g. Council Decision 1999). The long-term nature of these 
programmes allows comparing ENP activities with the pre-ENP era. Finally, freedom of media is an 
essential part of supporting democracy in neighbouring countries. In contrast to the OSCE, the EU is a 
rather young player in the field of media support but views the instrument of media support as a central 
tool of democracy promotion (see e.g. von Franqué 2008). Clearly, the great scope of influence has to be 
evaluated against the danger of misbalancing national media markets.
Economic Cooperation: “The basic deal the EU has offered the ENP states consists of economic cooperation 
in exchange for political reforms” (Vincentz 2007: 117). However, the economic dimension of ENP remains 
rather vague. The Action Plans give only broad guidelines and do not give threshold levels for eventual 
achievement (Noutcheva/Emerson 2007: 91). Different to EU enlargement and Balkan policies, ENP has a 
development component and is strictly bilateral (see e.g. the approach of ENP as a “hub-and-spoke”model 
in Hummer 2005), which foregoes the chance of creating a unified economic region.5  There is a huge 
debate on appropriate models of future economic integration between ENP members and EU. The scope 
5 Recently, the EU announced a regional initiative ‘Eastern Neighbours of the EU’ - that is Eastern Partnership -   
that includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership foresees a substan-
tial upgrading of the level of political engagement, including the prospect of a new generation of Association 
Agreements, far-reaching integration into the EU economy, easier travel to the EU for citizens providing that 
security requirements are met, enhanced energy security arrangements benefiting all concerned, and incre-
ased financial assistance. The EU proposes much more intensive day to day support for partners‘ reform efforts 
through a new Comprehensive Institution Building program, and a new multilateral dimension which will bring 
partners together to address common challenges. The Partnership includes new measures to support the 
social and economic development of the six countries, and five flagship initiatives that will give very concrete 
evidence of the EU‘s support (EU Press Releases Rapid 2008). For Southern neighbors, the ‘Union for the Medi-
terranean’ was initiated (Euractiv 2008).
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of models ranges from bilateral deep free trade or multilateral simple free trade arrangements to a stake 
in the common market, with its four freedoms (maybe excluding freedom of labour). For the time being, 
economic integration remains to be a bilateral instrument which has a basic trade component and specific 
cooperation schemes depending on interest of either the EU or the ENP countries. Generally, cooperation 
is tailored to the bilateral relations and with the intension to postpone decisions on concrete steps of 
integration into the future (Lippert 2007; Maurer/Haerder 2007; Vincentz 2007; Lavenex et al. 2007).
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA): In contrast to the enlargement process, where JHA have only been 
discovered late, it has been an element of the Action Plans within ENP from the start, which demonstrates 
the increasing importance of security aspects. The main areas of demands and cooperation in JHA are 
migration and border policy, combating organised crime and drug trafficking and judicial and police training 
and cooperation (Occhipinti 2007). Policy regulations in the field of JHA bear several specific characteristics. 
First, some issues are primarily important for the EU’s internal security interests (for example organized 
crime, illegal migration, ‘third country rule’ in asylum policy, safeguarding EU’s Schengen regime). Second, 
JHA is both a short-term security strategy and a long-term initiative for good governance, democracy and 
socio-economic transformation. This obviously leads to conflicting strategies (see e.g. Wichmann 2007). 
As JHA contains obvious elements of EU’s interest, the EU consequently had to offer rewards, like visa 
facilitation against readmission of asylum seekers. Third, it is very much a sovereignty-sensitive policy 
area. Therefore, a lot of demands concerning policy changes affect core state functions like border policy 
or police cooperation. Finally, demands in JHA are closely linked with the acceptance of democratic values, 
which is obvious in areas, where the EU cannot offer concrete rewards for compliance like, for example, 
independent judiciary (Knelangen 2007: 91).
3.2.  Level of Compliance and Determinants of Europeanization
Dependent variable: Our dependent variable is Europeanization. This we operationalize through 
evaluating Ukraine’s compliance with EU demands. We regard Europeanization as domestic adaptation 
of EU’s demands through pressure, financial support and capacity building and domestic motivation (see 
e.g. Featherstone 2003). Of course, we are aware that we can only observe tentative results as the ENP 
is still too young for deeper effects. For providing a balanced view on compliance, we use the recent 
progress report on Ukraine 2008 (EU Progress Report Ukraine 2008) as well as a recent Ukraine study 
on implementation (Razumkov Centre 2008). As the ENP process began only some years ago, we are 
furthermore referring to the levels of cooperation which started with PCA already in the mid-1990s.
Independent variables: Following historical institutionalism, Europeanization of ENP member states is a 
consequence as well of intervening effects from EU’s side on domestic actors’ preferences as well as a 
result of long-term attitudes stemming form national culture, Soviet habits and so on. Thus, we assume 
that Europeanization effects are the result of both external influence by the EU and internal support, that 
is local perception of the external influence. External influence, in turn, is established by the EU’s demands, 
rewards, direct support, and degree of linkage. We derived these four independent variables from EU 
enlargement analysis. It has been discussed broadly that procedures and instruments of bilateral relations 
within the ENP resemble very much those of Eastern Enlargement (bilateral approach, progression 
  12 | KFG Working Paper No. 3 | August 2009 
reports, different categories of priorities and so on). Even though there is no real conditionality, we find 
’conditionality-inspired policy instruments’ (Wichmann 2007), especially in the promises concerning 
access to Internal Market and Justice and Home Affairs. Together with local perception, this gives five 
independent variables which determine Europeanization in ENP countries. They will be evaluated with 
respect to the three dimensions of ENP policies which are relevant for Ukraine to various degrees:
 
Independent Variables
Content and clarity of EU’s demands
Incentives and rewards
Direct financial support by EU
Forms and degree of linkage
Local perception of demands and reward
Content and clarity of EU’s demands: We assume that the degree of compliance, that is rule adoption, is 
more likely, when rules are as clear and as formal as possible (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 664f; 
Jacoby/Cernoch 2002). Rule clarity is especially important in the ENP, as there is no formal benchmark of 
demands, in contrast to Enlargement Europeanization, which is based on the acquis communautaire. As 
Action Plans – the core documents of ENP-EU relations – have been developed in ‘common ownership’ 
between ENP state and EU, they mostly remain rather unspecific (see e.g. Stratenschulte 2005) and have 
been very much dependent on the will to approximation from the side of the ENP state. 
Incentives and rewards: If we regard enlargement processes, the core incentive is the membership 
perspective (Grabbe 2001 called this incentive “gate-keeping”, hinting on the prospect of slowing/fastening 
the accession process), which is missing in the ENP. Following recent debates on the ENP, we assume that 
one has to look at single sectors in order to examine main incentives and rewards. For example in economic 
cooperation we may assume this is access to Internal Market or, at a lower level, trade liberalization. In 
JHP, in contrast, this may be visa facilitation (Sedelmeier 2007). Main incentives in the field of democracy 
promotion and conflict management are more difficult to identify, which we will show in our case study.
Direct financial support by EU:  There are a couple of financial programmes and special budgets giving 
financial support to the ENP states (e.g. TACIS, EIDHR, TEMPUS). These have been centralized since 2007 
in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a special financial instrument for ENP. 
In our study we try to evaluate changes of financial support since ENP started in contrast to cooperation 
under PCA.
Forms and degree of linkage: Given that rewards and direct support may be rather limited in the ENP, 
linkage defined as “the density of ties and cross-border flows between a particular country and […] the 
EU” (Levitsky/Way 2006: 383) may play a prominent role for determining the external influence. The 
linkage element is an important tool for administrative capacity building, for sharing each others ideas, 
for diffusion of norms and values between EU and ENP member state officials. In fact, the EU Commission 
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announced the possibility for the ENP states to participate in not less than 20 EU-agencies and 17 
Community programmes (Emerson et al. 2007).6  
Local perception of demands and rewards: Domestic policies set the stage for any impact the EU might 
have. We argue that impulses of the EU could successfully initiate institutional convergence, only if they 
supply appropriate well-focused incentives for the responsible internal actors and take into account 
possible veto-players of such a convergence (Melnykovska/Schweickert 2008). Along with Lavenex et al. 
(2007) we assume that perception is also influenced by the degree to which demands are regarded as 
affecting national sovereignty, for example in Justice and Home Affairs.
4.  Europeanization in Ukraine – From Enthusiasm Back to Reality? 
The Orange Revolution of 2004 has radically changed Ukraine’s transition path (Melnykovska/Schweickert 
2008). Contrary to President Kuchma, who used the declaration of Ukraine’s wish to join the EU as a way 
to legitimize his authority in Western Europe7,  the ambitions of the current Ukrainian leadership seem to 
be less declarative. Accordingly, Ukraine was among the first group of EU neighbours to negotiate and sign 
the AP (Wolczuk 2008) which followed the PCA dating from 1998. 
In the meantime, the rather lukewarm welcome from the EU (Emerson 2008; Afanasyeva et al. forthcoming) 
dampened initial enthusiasm considerably. The first three-year EU-Ukraine AP drafted in late 2004 – and 
signed with only few changes after the Orange Revolution in February 2005 – is still in force. Negotiations 
about a New Enhanced Agreement to replace the PCA, that is Association Agreement, and Free Trade Area 
(FTA) are still debated (Eurobulletin 2008; Veselovsky 2008).
The ENP does not entail a substantial increase in EU direct financial support to Ukraine until now. For 
2007-10, the ENP financial instrument (ENPI) allocates €494 million (€123.5 million per year in average) 
to Ukraine. Within the pre-ENP PCA (1999-2003), EU assistance to Ukraine amounts €697.9 million 
(approximately €140 million per year in average).8  Regarding sectoral distribution, it is astonishing that in 
2007 JHA benefits from infrastructure support (third Priority Area) most, with about 40 per cent of total 
ENPI money (plus extra money for special border projects9), whereas Democracy Promotion (first Priority 
Area) and Economic Cooperation (second Priority Area) only receive about 30 per cent each.
6 There is a debate on how to involve ENP states as much as possible in EU’s institutions without giving them 
voting rights. Plans such as the ‘Model of Modular Integration’, which suggests restricted voting rights in the 
Council and the EP (Maurer/Haerder 2007), or the ‘Association of Modernity and Stability’, which would require 
new common institutions between EU and ENP members (Lippert 2007).
7 The international recognition and farther cooperation with the EU could help to legitimate Kuchma’s presidency 
at the national level (Kuzio 2006).
8 This even reveals no improvement in comparison to EU assistance before the PCA (1991-98: € 288.3, approx. 
€160 million per year in average).
9 Migration and border management issues gain extra money through FRONTEX (European Agency for the Ma-
nagement of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders); and the management mission at the Transnist-
rian borders: EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) .This basic information supports 
the argument, developed above that JHA is a first priority from EU’s side (Wichmann 2007).
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The institutional framework of EU-Ukraine cooperation, that is annual bilateral presidential summits, 
cooperation councils, ministerial cooperation committees and specialized sub-committees, was established 
already in the pre-ENP era. During the current preparations of the New Enhanced Agreement, it was 
slightly expanded but, overall, it is largely copied from EU enlargement (Gromadzki et al. 2005; Beichelt 
2007). According to the supranational character of the EU, its institutional cooperation remains very much 
oriented on cooperation with the executive. There are low ties with the Ukrainian parliament although 
this would be helpful as well – as the parliament has to harmonize legislation with EU standards. 
In Ukraine, the general perception of ENP policies is rather mixed. Domestic elites agree on “European 
Choice”, but they differ in the time horizons of Ukraine’s membership in the EU and in the pace of 
domestic reforms to achieve its Europeanization. The political leadership is sometimes more involved 
in power distribution struggles than in carrying out reforms. Furthermore, politicians did not want to 
appear as “knocking on closed doors”. The majority of the population (48-55 per cent) is in favour of EU 
cooperation and only 16 per cent are against it (Ukrainian Monitor 2005, cited in Wolczuk 2008). However, 
both politicians and the population interpret the ENP as a ‘temporary mechanism’ for Ukraine on the 
road to EU membership. This positive attitude is, however, not homogeneous across regions.10  Therefore, 
EU incentives building on this positive attitude could have a significant impact on Europeanization, if 
well-targeted. However, as the following discussion reveals, there is more reason for scepticism than for 
optimism in this respect.
4.1 Democracy Promotion - Slightly Used Although Highly Potential?
Timely coinciding with the democratic breakthrough (McFaul/Aslund 2006), the EU offered an ENP AP to 
Ukraine, which put more emphasis on democracy promotion than the PCA document before. Different to 
PCA, which limited democracy promotion to political dialogue and consultations on the “observance of 
the principles of democracy”, the ENP AP upgrades the scope and intensity of political cooperation and 
identifies “strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the 
rule of law” among its priorities.11  Furthermore, the AP envisages a number of concrete demands, rewards 
and mechanisms to promote democracy in Ukraine, but it contains no substantial linkage mechanisms. 12 
According to our scheme, we divide them along top-down and bottom-up sub-dimensions. 
In terms of top-down democracy promotion, the AP puts very clear demands on Ukraine’s compliance 
with democratic standards, that is ensuring the democratic conduct of presidential and parliamentary 
elections in Ukraine in accordance with OSCE standards, gradual approximation of Ukraine legislation, 
norms and standards with those of the EU, the independence of the judiciary and development of 
10 The opinion survey shows deep differences in foreign policy orientations between four parts of the country. The 
EU is largely supported in the western (75 per cent of respondents) and central regions (57 per cent) and less in 
the southern (37 per cent) and eastern regions (34 per cent) (Razumkov Centre 2008: 48).
11 In contrast to the APs of other ENP countries, the Country Strategy and EU-Ukraine AP reveal a stronger weight 
of Ukraine in treating more priorities and offering further reaching perspectives, especially in the area of demo-
cracy (Beichelt 2007).
12 None of seven joint sub-committees deals with the issues of democracy.
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administrative capacities. The determinacy of demands and level of demands were recently exemplified 
when in exchange for the free elections in 2006 and 2007 the EU offered the beginning of negotiation on 
FTA (Euractiv 2007).
The EU’s involvement in the 2006-07 parliamentary elections, have been limited to what we call cross-
checking, that is referring to activities of OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions (where always some 
EP-members are participating) through official statements taking issues with OSCE-elections reports 
(Solana 2007). Besides reference to electoral standards in Ukraine, the field of rule of law-support is part 
of EU activities. For this, EU mainly approves statements of Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, which 
constantly demands efficient checks and balances between state powers (EU Progress Report Ukraine 
2008). The EU also supports joint cooperation programmes with the Council of Europe for judges’ and 
human rights experts’ training (EU Progress Report Ukraine 2008). There is neither punishment nor 
substantial reward and thus weak leverage in the field of the rule of law.  Unwilling to destabilize the 
‘orange’ coalitions (McFaul 2005; Kuzio 2006), the EU reacts rather softly to violations of the rule of law 
(for example on corruption scandal of Tymoshenko-government in 2005 and political pressing on the 
Constitutional Court) and does not charge the Ukrainian leadership with any punishment.13  
In order to support the rule of law, EU membership perspective would be very helpful. Yet, the EU does 
not offer this reward and thus discourages the elite groups. The New Enhanced Agreement only offers EU-
Association, which is too less attractive to improve the rule of law. Unlike the Council of Europe, the EU 
also has weak linkage mechanisms here because there are no specialized advisory institutions.  
Concerning bottom-up democracy promotion, the EU is less clear in its demands. It stresses the need to 
develop civil society, to ensure respect for human rights and national minorities, to guarantee freedom 
of media and to improve systems of higher education. The absence of political rewards in this field is 
compensated through direct financial support through TACIS, EDIHR, and Tempus facilities.14  Bottom-up 
Europeanization focused on civil society and education enjoys strong domestic support (Gromadzki et al. 
2005).
13 Solana (2007), for example, argued that Ukraine has had a series of political crises in the past years, largely 
stemming from a lack of clarity on the basic ground rules of political life and lack of checks-and-balances, but 
avoided to blame political elite for these crises.
14 In 2004-06, TACIS included the projects on bottom-up democracy promotion – through the close cooperation 
with the national government – with the budget of €10 million for civil society, media and democracy. EIDHR 
is more civil society and human rights oriented; its micro projects-program ensures an additional – without 
direct involvement of the national government – financial support for civil society.  Although Ukraine attracted 
the largest amount of funds within this Initiative, EDIHR finances are limited: from 1999 to 2006 it allocates 
only €5.95 million for Ukrainian NGOs. Within ENP, the EU also fosters people-to-people programmes, that is 
exchange between Ukrainian and EU state’s societies. This is first and foremost focused on higher education. 
The budget line Tempus promoted since 1993 voluntary EU-ization in the field of higher education. The EU also 
has conducted the extra projects to promote democracy in a bottom-up way. In 2004, the EU launched three 
election projects combing NGOs, education and media promotion with the funding budget of €1 million (EU 
Delegation to Ukraine 2004).
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4.2 Economic Cooperation: Huge Asymmetry of Preferences and Time Horizons
The ENP builds on PCA’s economic demands and aims at bringing Ukraine’s legislation in compliance with 
requirements of the Single European Market and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The EU significantly 
helped WTO membership by targeting the promotion of GATT principles like most favoured nation clause, 
national treatment, freedom of transit, and basic prohibition of quantitative restrictions. In exchange for 
economic reforms, the ENP AP offers the following economic rewards for Ukraine: increased financial and 
technical assistance through the ENPI, enhanced preferential trade relations, with a FTA perspective, on 
in the long-term a ‘stake’ in the Single European Market dependent on progress in implementing EU’s 
demands.
Most importantly, these economic rewards are applied not exclusively to achieve Europeanization in 
the economic cooperation but in other dimensions, for example democracy promotion (Sasse 2002; EU-
Ukraine Action Plan 2005). This has been exemplified when, in exchange for the repeated run off elections 
in 2004, the EU granted ex post the full-fledged market economy status to Ukraine (2005). In addition, 
the EU was concerned with democratic elections in Ukraine in 2006 and 2007, and linked this with the 
reward to assist Ukraine with WTO accession process. In contrast to democracy promotion, the linkage 
mechanisms in economic cooperation between Ukraine and EU are well developed: five out of seven sub-
committees (already established through PCA) work on economic issues (PCA 1998; Solonenko 2005).
In addition, a FTA and a stake in the EU Single European Market are the most attractive rewards for 
Europeanization (Kelley 2006; Melnykovska/Schweickert 2008) and would have high local support 
(Razumkov Centre 2008). The EU already became the by far largest trade partner (approximately 90 per 
cent of exports and imports) and foreign investor (75 per cent in 2007) in Ukraine. At the same time, 
Ukrainian expectations concerning FTA and a ‘stake’ in the Single European Market are limited as any 
agreement is likely to exclude major trade in EU ‘sensitive’ sectors like heavy industry and agricultural 
products (Mayhew/Copsey 2006; Emerson et al. 2006). This clearly reflects an asymmetry of interests 
between the EU and Ukraine and weakens in fact these incentives.
The asymmetry of interest is also evident in the cooperation on energy and transport. Although it is 
mutually beneficial and contributes to geopolitical security and economic independence of both, Ukraine 
and the EU, they nevertheless emphasize different preferences in this field. EU’s basic goal is to successively 
extend the principles of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (like the rule of law) to the EU’s periphery.15 
Ukraine is keen on eliminating its dependency on Russian energy, but got little assistance from the EU 
in its quest for energy diversification.16  Recently, the government of Tymoshenko asked the EU to help 
15 The Energy Charter focuses on the rule of law and the role of governments in providing robust frameworks for 
foreign investment in the energy sector. The EU has signed the Memorandum of Understanding on co-opera-
tion in the field of energy with Ukraine in December 2005. The Commission also starts Black Sea and Caspian 
Sea energy cooperation initiative with Ukraine that aims at the progressive integration of this region into the 
European energy market. In late 2006, the Commission announced plans to move towards ‘sub-regional energy 
markets’ (European Commission 2007).
16 The EU helps Ukraine to modernize its pipelines system through INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to 
Europe). The programme was launched in 1995, revised in 2004-06 and involved 21 countries (most partici-
pants are the post-communist countries). However, the main aim of this programme is not to directly finance, 
but to attract foreign investors to the modernization of Ukraine’s oil and gas transport system.
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with the implementation of the ‘White Stream’ project delivering Caspian gas via Georgia and Ukraine to 
Europe. This, however, is – in contrast to the pipeline projects south stream and north stream, which do 
not include Ukraine – not a priority from the EU’s side (Sherr 2007; Stent 2008; Lukyanov 2008).
4.3 Justice and Home Affairs: the EU’s Primary Interest?
Before the ENP, the EU demands towards Ukraine were focused on cross border cooperation (CBC), that is 
migration and border management, money laundering and trafficking in human beings, with the objective 
to minimize risks related to different kinds of cross-border crime (Knelangen 2007). Within the ENP, the 
EU’s priority shifted towards governance-related matters. The main tool the EU uses for promoting good 
governance in Justice and Home Affairs is linkage-oriented: TWINNING and TAIEX. TWINNING aims at 
developing the capacity of the public administration. In 2006, the EU started the implementation of 
three twinning projects, 22 further projects are planned. Ukrainian request for TWINNING on JHA issues 
is rather moderate because of the long-term preparations’ procedures and ‘domestic’ sensitivity of the 
issues dealt with, for example conservative attitudes among bureaucracy unwilling to change to EU 
practices (Wichmann 2007). On the contrary, TAIEX assistance with a short term consultative character 
is welcomed by domestic lower-level authorities. Furthermore, the AP on JHA relies on well-developed 
linkages within the ENP at all levels of seniority. There is even a Ministerial Troika on EU-related JHA 
issues. The responsibility for implementing, monitoring, evaluating and identifying priorities is devoted 
to a so-called Scoreboard, a special joint body on legal harmonization that has widely been used either in 
EU internal integration or in enlargement (Occhipinti 2007). Ukraine is the only ENP country to resort to 
such an instrument, which highlights its distinctive profile among the neighbours. Furthermore the legal 
harmonization is supported by UEPLAC (Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre) that gives 
consultations on law drafting to Ukrainian authorities (Whitmore 2006).
So far, Ukraine’s strategy to position itself as a ‘would-be’ EU accession candidate and to provide a 
role model for the ENP (Wichmann 2007) seems to have been not very successful in terms of rewards. 
Ukraine granted free-visa travel rights to citizens of all EU member states in 2005 on a voluntary basis 
while the EU demands readmission in exchange for visa simplifications for a small group of Ukrainian 
citizens. Negotiations on this do not take into consideration the status quo ante, that is free-visa regime 
for Ukrainians in the new Eastern EU member states until EU eastern enlargement in 2004 and in 2007. 
Common regional culture is somehow cut through that, which has a negative impact on the local perception 
of Europeanization, especially for the pro-EU oriented western regions (Kravchenko 2007; Silina 2008). 
In addition, it seems to be obvious that further cooperation in JHA issues does not buy any additional 
rewards, especially no EU concessions with respect to deeper economic integration. As a result, starting 
in 2008, Ukrainian authorities already started to diminish their support for the cooperation with the EU in 
JHA (for example postponing of free visa access to new EU-members Romania and Bulgaria) (Silina 2008).
As an additional demand, the AP features EU-Ukraine cooperation on crisis management in Moldova, 
thereby focusing on the external conflict in Transnistria, formerly belonging to Moldova. The EU ‘discovered’ 
this conflict after becoming geographically closer to Moldova.17  In 2006, under EU call, Yushchenko 
17 In 2005, the EU appointed a Special Representative of the EU in Moldova with the aim of contributing to con-
flict settlement and strengthening EU role in the conflict.
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introduced new custom rules along the Transnistria stretch of its border with Moldova.18  The Ukrainian 
move has effectively imposed a ban on exports by Tiraspol to Russia, its main trade partner. EU-Ukraine 
cooperation in this field is therefore very much related to JHA (we already mentioned the EU Border 
Assistance Mission on the Moldova-Ukraine).19  For sure, the EU currently benefits from the willingness of 
Ukraine’s government to improve its international image by contributing to the conflict resolution.
4.4 Answering the Dependent Variable: the Level of Europeanization in Ukraine
As mentioned above, our evaluation for answering the dependent variable is primarily based on the EU 
Progress Report Ukraine (2008) and an expert analysis of Razumkov Centre (Razumkov Centre 2008)20. 
The Report shows overall progress made on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine AP. From a more 
formal perspective, the Razumkov study states (for the time frame 2005-07) that “although 224 of 227 
government measures complied with the content of the AP, only 11 (or 15 per cent) of 73 items (priorities) 
for action listed in the AP have been fulfilled. The overwhelming majority (62 or 85 per cent) of items 
still needs to be completed (61 – partially implemented, one of the listed items21  in the AP has not been 
implemented)”.
If we compare the dimensions of our analytical framework, it is striking that – according to the Razumkov 
study - in the dimension “democracy” more than half of the activities were not carried out (19 of 39). This 
is the only dimension, where the share of open issues is higher than that of the implemented ones. In 
particular, the Progress Report criticizes a power struggle between parliament and cabinet on the one 
side and the president on the other side, concerning the scope of power of the cabinet.22  Apart from 
that, there are three fields, where the share of the implemented issues is comparably high: trade and 
market regulations (30 fully implemented, in contrast to 22 partly implemented and 9 not), transport 
issues (7/6/1) and JHA (2/1/0). The findings of the Razumkov expert surveys are to a certain extent in 
line with the Progress Report’s assessment. This EU report recognizes Ukraine’s significant progress in 
the areas related to WTO accession, FTA negotiations, legislative approximation on customs, and the 
management of EUBAM. The above mentioned issues have been evaluated as being of rather high interest 
from Ukraine’s side. Furthermore, we evaluated “energy” as showing a very big asymmetry of interests. 
This view is supported by both documents: while the Progress Reports argues that Ukraine made good 
progress in the energy sector – for example through the ongoing implementation of the Memorandum 
18 The new rules make illegal the shipment of any goods from the Russian-speaking separatist Transdniester regi-
on that has not been cleared by Moldovan customs.
19 The budget of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) accounts €24 million for 
2005-09. During the first six months, the European Commission financed the Mission through the Rapid Reac-
tion Mechanism (€4 million) (EUBAM 2007). In addition, the EU launched a €9.9 million project called Improve-
ment of Border Controls at the Moldova-Ukraine border (BOMMOLUK) (Popescu 2005).
20    From 2006 to 2008 Razumkov Centre conducted three survey of 101-103 experts in the field of international 
relations – representatives of central and regional government bodies, government research structures, non-
governmental analytical centers and journalists – to evaluate the success of Ukraine’s European integration 
Policy, in particular, the implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. 
21 In the field of people-to-people contacts.
22 The EU criticizes the way decision making: instead of constitutional amendments there was a see-saw on the 
law between parliament, cabinet and president.
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of Understanding on Energy – the implementation quota reported by Razumkov Centre is low: here only 
4 out of 27 issues have been completed, beside 15 partially completed and 9 not implemented issues 
(Razumkov Centre 2008: 2f).
All in all, the Razumkov study gives reason for hope, as implementation deficits in 2007 have been due to 
the dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament which led to the postponing of law reviews. Further prospects of 
AP implementation are regarded as being very much dependent on the results of the currently negotiated 
New Enhanced Agreement between EU and Ukraine (Razumkov Centre 2008: 2). On the contrary, the EU 
tries not to raise too much hope concerning the planned New Enhanced Agreement.
5.  Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an analytical framework for operationalizing Neighbourhood Europeanization 
through ENP policies. Theoretical and empirical evidence amply demonstrates inconsistencies of the 
basic ENP-concept: combination of rather high demands with rather weak conditionality. Similarly, our 
econometric analysis showed that the role of basic cooperation agreements for Europeanization is rather 
mixed. In addition there are a number of other potential external drivers of institutional change. In 
particular NATO could play a complementary role offering security related incentives.23  
Defining Europeanization as the compliance with EU demands, we investigated the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan by looking at three dimensions of ENP policies – democracy promotion, economic cooperation, and 
JHA – which are shown to depend on five independent variables – content and clarity of EU demands, 
incentives and rewards, direct financial support, forms and degree of linkage, and local perception of 
demands and rewards.
Our conclusion from this case study is that – given the top-down formulation of EU interests combined 
with weak conditionality – rewards and local perception of demands are decisive variables for the 
effectiveness of ENP policies in Ukraine. Top-down democracy promotion was effective after the Orange 
Revolution when the EU granted the full-fledged market status, later the EU gave assistance for WTO-
membership. Arguably, this helped business interests to unify and support democratic change (Puglisi 
2008). Democracy promotion was definitely less effective afterwards, as there are low rewards and there 
is low local perception for top-down democracy promotion. On the contrary, the bottom-up democracy 
promotion paradoxically benefits from high local support in the Ukrainian society and low demands 
and rewards. Europeanization in JHA benefited from Ukraine’s willingness to converge towards EU-style 
norms. Demands on better governance of the border regimes of Eastern European states, focuses, first 
and foremost, on the EU’s own security interest. Ukraine is aware of this EU strategy.
 Nevertheless, sustainability of this policy seems to be doubtful as there is decreasing hope on the side 
of Ukraine that voluntary actions pay off in the future. In this respect, future rewards have a potential 
to motivate Europeanization, only if they are well defined already in the short-term. This applies, above 
all, to economic integration, especially a substantial FTA agreement. Ukraine is clearly the ENP country 
23 The case of Georgia already amply demonstrated the increasing importance of security issues and the need to 
integrate ENP countries positions.
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for which economic incentives matter most. In the field of energy relations the EU-first-strategy and the 
importance of Russia in EU energy policy affects the ENP like a huge shadow.
The analysis also demonstrates substantial asymmetries in the preferences and time horizons of 
cooperation between the EU and Ukraine across all dimensions, but in particular in economic (Ukraine: 
fast and high; EU: slow and low) and JHA (Ukraine: free visa regime, additional rewards; EU: multiple-
applicable small rewards, no further concessions) dimensions. In a sense, these asymmetries clearly 
reflect the inconsistency of the ENP concept mentioned above. According to this point, explanations of 
enlargement theories seem helpful: we must be aware that the prospects of compliance are negative, if 
relevant incentives are offered too far in the future.  
The political instability of Ukraine since the Orange Revolution (government instabilities) has been a core 
obstacle to maximize Europeanization through the ENP. Domestic themes very often dominated the political 
agenda. In this context, the ENP acted as a catalyst but not as the main driver of Europeanization. The 
role of the domestic situation is predominant for the pace and degree of Europeanization. Our case study 
shows that a certain stage of willingness and domestic motivation for institutional reform in the direction 
of good governance, democracy and Europeanization is an important precondition for implementing the 
ENP. Progress in Ukraine is therefore first and foremost a consequence of the home-driven dynamic for 
reform. Ukraine from the beginning of ENP-integration stated that the missing membership perspective 
is somehow humiliating. Its motivation for convergence with EU criteria is and remains the hope for EU 
membership, which the ENP does not offer. Such motivation is unstable and can disappear fast in an 
inconsistent instrument as the ENP is.
 
                        Neighbourhood Europeanization Through ENP - The Case of Ukraine | 21
Literature
Afanasyeva, Elena/Hammermann, Felix/Schweickert, Rainer forthcoming: From a Soviet past to a European 
future, in: International Journal of Economics.
Anastasakis, Othon 2005: The Europeanization of the Balkans, in: Browns Journal of World Affairs 12:1, 
77-88. 
Andrei, Tudorel/Teodorescu, Daniel 2005: The Link Between Corruption, Development, and Military 
Expanditures: Making the Case for Accession to NATO, in: International Journal of Economic 
Development 7:1, 1-24.
Axt, Heinz-Jürgen/Milososki, Antonio/Schwarz, Oliver 2007: Europäisierung - ein weites Feld. Literaturbericht 
und Forschungsfragen, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 48: 1, 136-149.
Barany, Zoltan 2004: NATO’s Peaceful Advance, in: Journal of Democracy 15: 1, 63-76.
Barbé, Esther/Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth 2008: The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, in: International Affairs 84: 1, 81-96.
Beichelt, Timm 2007: Democracy promotion in Eastern Europe in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in: European Union Studies Association (EUSA), 10th Biennial 
Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal, Canada.
Boonstra, Jos 2007: NATO’s Role in Democratic Reform. Democracy promotion, in: Fundación para las 
Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Working Paper, 1 May 2007, Spain.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse Thomas 2004: One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law. Democracy promotion, Paper prepared for the Workshop on 
Democracy Promotion organized by the Center for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of 
Law, 4-5 October 2004, Stanford University.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse Thomas 2007: Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of EU Politics, in: Jorgensen, 
Knud/Pollack, Mark A./Rosamund, Ben (Eds.): Handbook of European Union Politics, London, 
483-504. 
Council Decision 1999: Adopting the third phase of the trans-European cooperation scheme for higher 
education 2000-2006 (Tempus III), 1999/311/EC, Council of Europe, Brussels.
Cowles, Maria Green/Caporaso, James A./Risse, Thomas (Eds.) 2001: Transforming Europe. Europeanization 
and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY.
Crawford, Gordon 2000: European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy, in: 
Burnell, Peter (Ed.): Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democracy, London, 
90-127.
Di Tommaso, Maria L./Raiser, Martin/Weeks, Melvyn 2007: Home Grown or Imported? Initial Conditions, 
External Anchors, and the Determinants of Institutional Reform in the Transition Economies, in: 
Economic Journal 117: 520, 858-881.
Emerson, Michael 2004a: Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation, CEPS Working Paper No. 
214, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Emerson, Michael 2004b: ENP: Strategy or Placebo? CEPS Working Paper No. 215, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels.
Emerson, Michael 2004c: Europeanisation and Conflict Resolution: Testing an Analytical Framework, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 59, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Emerson, Michael 2005: The Reluctant Debutante: the European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its 
Neighbourhood, CEPS Working Document No. 223, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Emerson, Michael 2008: Policies towards Ukraine, 2005-20: Status Quo Unintended, in: CEPS Working 
Document No. 281, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
  22 | KFG Working Paper No. 3 | August 2009 
Emerson, Michael/Edwards, Huw/Gazizullin, Ildar/Lücke, Matthias/Müller-Jentsch, Daniel/Nanivska, 
Vira/Pyanytskiy, Valeriy/Schneider, Andreas/Schweickert, Rainer/Shevtsov, George/Shumylo, 
Olga 2006: The prospects of deep free trade between the European Union and Ukraine, CEPS 
Paperback, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Emerson, Michael/Noutcheva, Gergana/Popescu, Nicu 2007: European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years 
on: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP plus’, CEPS Policy Brief 126, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels.
Epstein, Rachel A. 2005: NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations, in: 
Security Studies 14: 1, 63-105.
EU – Ukraine Action Plan 2005; in: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ 
ap_final_en.pdf; 8 December 2008. 
EU Delegation to Ukraine 2004: European Union funded projects in support of the presidential elections  
 in Ukraine, www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/page313201.html; 8 December 2008. 
 EU Press Releases Rapid 2008: The Eastern Partnership – an Ambitious New Chapter in the EU’s  
 Relations with its Eastern Neighbours, in: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer 
 ence=IP/08/1858&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; 8 December 2008.
EU Progress Report Ukraine 2008: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 2007, 
Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 402, 3 April 2008, Brussels.
EUBAM 2007: Annual Report 2007, in: http://www.eubam.org/files/500-599/500/Report_2008_ 
ENGL.pdf; 8 December 2008.
Euractiv 2007: EU presses Ukraine on upcoming elections, 17 September 2007, in: http://www.euractiv.
com/en/enlargement/eu-presses-ukraine-upcoming-elections/article-166781; 7 December 
2008.
Euractiv 2008: Summit approves ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, 14 March 2008, in: http://www.euractiv.
com/en/enlargement/summit-approves-union-mediterranean/article-170976; 8 December 
2008.
Eurobulletin 2008: New Agreement on Association will leave the issues of Ukraine’s Membership open, 
European Commission Delegation to Ukraine, 11 November 2008.
European Commission 2007: Strategic Energy Review; in: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/  
 2008_11_ser2_en.htm; 11 November 2008.
Featherstone, Kevin 2003: Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’, in: Featherstone, Kevin/Radaelli, Claudio 
M. (Eds.): The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford, 3-26. 
Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 2006: Remarks on democracy promotion, Paper prepared for conference organised 
by the European Parliament’s Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe:  Democracy 
Promotion: The European Way, 7 December 2006, European Commission, Brussels.
French, David/Meijenfeldt, Roel 2006: A European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership. A 
proposal to the Democracy Caucus of the European Parliament for a new initiative in EU 
democracy assistance world-wide, Brussels, unv. Ms.
George, Alexander L./Bennett, Andrew 2005: Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Science, 
Cambridge.
Grabbe, Heather 2001: How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and 
Diversity, in: Journal of European Public Policy 8: 6, 249-268.
Grabbe, Heather 2006: The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Basingstoke.
Gromadzki, Grzegorz/Sushko, Oleksandr/Vahl, Marius, Wolczuk, Kataryna/Wolczuk, Roman 2005: Will the 
Orange Revolution bear fruit? EU–Ukraine relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006, Warsaw.
Hague, Rod/Harrop, Martin 1998: Comparative Government and Politics, Basingstoke.
Hummer, Waldemar 2005: Die Union und ihre Nachbarn - Nachbarschaftspolitik vor und nach dem 
Verfassungsvertrag, in: Integration 28: 3, 231-245.
                        Neighbourhood Europeanization Through ENP - The Case of Ukraine | 23
Jacoby, Wade/Cernoch, Pavel 2002: The Pivotal EU Role in the Creation of Czech Regional Policy, in: Linden, 
Ronald (Ed.): Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and 
East European States, Lanham, 317-341.
Jahn, Egbert 2007: Ausdehnung und Überdehnung. Von der Integrationskonkurrenz zwischen Brüssel und 
Moskau zum Ende der europäischen Integrationsfähigkeit, in: Osteuropa 57: 2-3, 35-55.
Kelley, Judith 2006: New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 44: 1, 29-55.
Kempe, Iris 2007: Zwischen Anspruch und Realität. Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik, in: Osteuropa 
57: 2-3, 57-68.
Knelangen, Wilhelm 2007: A Neighbourhood of Freedom, Security and Justice?, in: Varwick, Johannes/
Lang, Kai-Olaf (Eds.): European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the 
New Neighbours, Opladen, 78-101.
Kobzar, Svitlana A. 2006: The European Union as a Factor in the Democratization of Ukraine, Presentation 
given at the conference “New Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine: Politics, History, and 
Culture”, University of Toronto, 17-19 March 2006.
Kravchenko, Vladimir 2007: Ukraine-EU Visa Regime: Doesn’t Europe want too much?, in: Zerkalo Nedeli, 
No. 35, 22 - 28 September 2007, in: http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/60557/; 8 December 2008.
Kuzio, Taras 2006: Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?, in: The Washington Quarterly 29: 3, 89-108.
Lang, Kai-Olaf 2007: European Neighbourhood Policy: Where Do We Stand, Where Are We Heading? 
Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours, in: Varwick, Johannes/Lang, Kai-
Olaf. (Eds.): European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy towards the New 
Neighbours, Opladen, 15-23.
Lavenex, Sandra 2004: EU External Governance in “Wider Europe”, in: Journal of European Public Policy 
11: 4, 680-700.
Lavenex, Sandra/Lehmkuhl, Dirk/Wichmann, Nicole 2007: Die Nachbarschaftspolitiken der Europäischen 
Union: zwischen Hegemonie und erweiterter Governance, in: Tömmel, Ingeborg (Ed.): Die 
Europäische Union: Governance und Policy-Making, Wiesbaden, 367-388.
Lavenex, Sandra/Schimmelfennig, Frank 2006: Relations with the Wider Europe, in: Journal of Common 
Market Studies (JCMS) 44: 1, 137-154.
Levitsky, Steven/Way, Lucan A. 2006: Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International dimension of 
Regime Change, in: Comparative Politics 38: 4, 379-400.
Lippert, Barbara 2007: Beefing up the ENP: Toward a Modernization and Stability Partnership, in: Varwick, 
Johannes/Lang, Kai-Olaf. (Eds.): European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy 
Towards the New Neighbours, Opladen, 181-196.
Lukyanov, Fyodor 2008: Russia – EU: The Partnership that Went Astray, in: Europe-Asia Studies 60: 6, 
1107-1119.
Mahncke, Dieter/Gstöhl, Sieglinde (Eds.) 2008: Europe’s Near Abroad – Promises and Prospects of the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels.  
Maier, Sylvia/Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: Shared Values: Democracy and Human Rights, in: Weber, 
Katja/Smith, Michael E./ Baun, Michael (Eds.): Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or 
Periphery?, Manchester and New York, 39-57.
Maurer, Andreas/Haerder, Max 2007: Alternatives to Full Membership of the EU, in: Varwick, Johannes/
Lang, Kai-Olaf (Eds.): European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the 
New Neighbours, Opladen, 197-216.
Mayhew, Alan/Copsey, Nathaniel 2006: The European Neighbourhood Policy: The Case of Ukraine, in: SEI 
Seminar Papers, 1, University of Sussex, 7-19. 
McFaul, Michael 2005: Transition from Post-Communism, in: Journal of Democracy 16: 3, 5-19.
  24 | KFG Working Paper No. 3 | August 2009 
McFaul, Michael/Aslund, Anders 2006: Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic 
Breakthrough, Washington.
Melnykovska, Inna/Schweickert, Rainer 2008: Bottom-up or Top-down: What Drives the Convergence 
of Ukraine’s Institutions towards European Standards?, in: Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies 8: 4, 445-468.
Noutcheva, Gergana/Emerson, Michael 2007: Economic and Social Development, in: Weber, Katja/ 
 Smith, Michael E., Baun, Michael (Eds.): Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or  
 Periphery?, Manchester and New York, 76-96.
Occhipinti, John D. 2007: Justice and Home Affairs: Immigration and Policing, in: Weber, Katja/  
 Smith, Michael E., Baun, Michael (Eds.): Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners   
 or Periphery?, Manchester and New York, 114-133.
O’Connell, Kevin 2008: EU Visa Policy: Squaring the Circle of Neighbourhood and JHA Objectives, in:  
 Mahncke, Dieter/Gstöhl, Sieglinde (Eds.): Europe’s Near Abroad. Promises and Prospects of the  
 EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 115-134.
O’Donnell, Clara/Whitman, Richard G. 2007: Das Phantom-Zuckerbrot. Die Konstruktionsfehler der ENP,  
 in: Osteuropa 57: 2-3, 95-104.
PCA 1998: Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and   
 their Member States, and Ukraine; in: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.  
 do?uri=CEL EX:31998D0149:EN:NOT; 8 December 2008.
Pop-Eleches, Grigore 2007: Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of Western Integration:   
 Democratic Conditionality after Communism, in: East European Politics and Societies 21: 1, 142- 
 161.
Popescu, Nicu 2005: The EU in Moldova – Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood, in: EU-ISS Occasional  
 Paper 60.
Pridham, Geoffrey 1999: Complying with the European Union’s Democratic Conditionality: Transnational  
 Party Linkages and Regime Chance in Slovakia 1993-1998, in: Europe-Asia Studies 51: 7, 1221– 
 1244.
Pridham, Geoffrey 2000: EU Accession and domestic politics: Policy consensus and interactive dynamics  
 in central and eastern Europe, in: Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1: 1, 49-74.
Prodi, Romano 2002: A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, in: Speech held at the  
 Sixth ECSA-World Conference: Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role  
 of the EU, 5-6 December 2002, Brussels, European Commission.
Puglisi, Rosaria 2008: A Window to the World? Oligarchs and Foreign Policy in Ukraine, in: Fischer,  
 Sabine/Puglisi, Rosaria/Wolczuk, Kataryna (Eds.): Ukraine, Quo Vadis? Chaillot Paper 108, Paris,  
 55-86.
Radaelli, Claudio M. 2003: The Europeanization of Public Policy, in: Featherstone, Kevin/Radaelli, Claudio  
 M. (Eds.): The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford, 27-56.
Razumkov Centre 2008: Assessments of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan Implementation in 2005-2007, in: 
National Security and Defence 100: 6, 2-21.
Rhein, Eberhard 2007: The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Critical Assessment. European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours, in: Varwick, 
Johannes/Lang, Kai-Olaf. (Eds.): European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy 
towards the New Neighbours, Opladen, 39-47.
Sandler, Todd/Hartley, Keith 1999: The Political Economy of NATO, New York. 
Sasse, Gwendolyn 2002: The EU Common Strategy on Ukraine: A Response to Ukraine’s ‘pro-European 
Choice’, in: Lewis, Ann (Ed.): The EU and Ukraine. Neighbours, Friends, Partners?, Federal Trust 
for Education and Research, London.
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic 
Transformation in Eastern Europe, in: East European Politics and Societies 21: 1, 126-141.
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Sedelmeier, Ulrich 2004: Governance by Conditionality: EU rule transfer to the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in: Journal of European Public Policy 11: 4, 
661-679.
                        Neighbourhood Europeanization Through ENP - The Case of Ukraine | 25
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Sedelmeier, Ulrich 2005: Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization 
of Central and Eastern Europe, in: Schimmelfennig, Frank/Sedelmeier, Ulrich (Eds.): The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca and London, 1-28.
Sedelmeier, Ulrich 2006: Europeanisation in new member and candidate states, in: Living Review of 
European Governance 1: 3, in: www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3; 25 February 2009.
Sedelmeier, Ulrich 2007: The European Neighbourhood Policy. A comment on Theory and Policy, in: Weber, 
Katja/Smith, Michael E./Baun, Michael (Eds.): Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or 
Periphery?, Manchester and New York, 195-208.
Sherr, James 2007: Energy Security: At Last, a Response from the EU, in: Zerkalo Nedeli, Ukraine’s 
International Social Political Weekly 9: 638, in: http://www.mw.ua/1000/1030/56095/; 8 
December 2008.
Silina, Tatiana 2008: Third-Rate People for Good?, in: Zerkalo Nedeli, Ukraine’s International Social Political 
Weekly 25: 704, in: http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/63478/; 18 November 2008.
Smith, Karen E. 2001: Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy, in: Pravda Alex/Zielonka, Jan 
(Eds.): Democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume 2: International and transnational 
factors. Oxford, 31-57.
Solana, Javier 2007: Interview in Zerkalo Nedeli, Ukraine’s International Social Political Weekly 34: 663, in: 
http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/60477/; 8 December 2008.   
Solonenko, Iryna 2005: The European Union as Democracy Promoter: The Case of Ukraine, in: The 
Romanian Journal of Political Sciences 2, 57-69.
Stent, Angela 2008: Restoration and Revolution in Putin’s Foreign Policy, in: Europe-Asia Studies 60: 6, 
1089-1106.
Stratenschulte, Eckart D. 2005: Ukraine: ‘Und jetzt: action!’ Die Aktionspläne der Europäischen 
Nachbarschafts politik, in: Osteuropa 55: 2, 15-23.
Vachudova, Milada A. 2005: Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism, 
Oxford.
Veselovsky, Andriy 2008: European Integration is for the Worthy, in: Zerkalo Nedeli, Ukraine’s International 
Social Political Weekly 43: 722, in: http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/64718/; 8 December 2008.   
Vincentz, Volkhart 2007: The European Neighbourhood Policy: An Economic Perspective, in: Varwick, 
Johannes/Lang, Kai-Olaf (Eds.): European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy 
Towards the New Neighbours, Opladen, 117-128.
Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio/Schweickert, Rainer/Movchan, Veronica/Bilan, Olena/Burskovsky, Igor 2006: Now 
So Near, and Yet Still So Far: Relations between Ukraine and the European Union, in: Havrylyshyn, 
Oleh/ Vinhas de Souza, Lúcio (Eds.): Return to Growth in CIS Countries, Berlin, 144-190.
Vobruba, Georg, 2007: Expansion ohne Erweiterung. Die EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik in der Dynamik Europas, 
in: Osteuropa 57: 2-3, 7-20.
Von Franqué, Friederike 2008: Medienhilfe als Instrument der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Ziele, Motive 
und Implementierungswege internationaler Akteure in Bosnien-Herzegowina und Kosovo, 
Berlin.
Whitmore, Sarah 2006: Ukraine’s European Integration and the Role of Parliament, in: Wider-Europe 
Working Papers, Oxford Brookes University, in: http://wider-europe.org/research/papers/Whit 
more 2007.pdf; 8 December 2008.
Wichmann, Nicole 2007: The Interaction Between Justice and Home Affairs and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Taking Stock of the Logic, Objectives and Practices, in: CEPS Working 
Document 275, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Wolczuk, Kataryna 2008: Ukraine and its Relations with the EU in the Context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, in: Fischer, Sabine (Ed.) 2008: Ukraine: Quo Vadis? Chaillot Paper No. 108, 
Paris. 
  26 | KFG Working Paper No. 3 | August 2009 
Zangl, Bernhard 2001: Bringing Courts Back In. Normdurchsetzung im GATT, in der WTO und der EG, in: 
Swiss Political Science Review 7: 2, 49-80.
Appendix
Table A1 – Impact of EU Integration on Quality of Institutions in Transition Countries 
Measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI), 1996 - 2005
       
POLS POLS POLS FE
EU-Integration 0.177*** 0.236*** 0.166*** -0.004
(-5.03) (-5.99) (-4.6) (-0.07)
EU-Potential -0.708 0.036 -0.069
(-0.79) (-0.29) (-0.71)
NATO 0.064 0.056 0.087 0.227***
(-0.77) (-0.61) (-1.06) (-3.78)
WESTERN 0.605*** 0.726*** 0.648***
(-7.25) (-11.02) (-9.57)
AID -0.017** 0.018 -0.013 -0.006
(-2.19) (-1.54) (-1.42) (0.27)
LIBERALISATION 0.319*** 0.303*** 0.163**
(-6.74) (-5.63) (-2.56)
TENSIONS -0.23*** -0.149
(-4.24) (-1.65)
adj. R-squared 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.27
Observations 164 164 164 164
Notes: POLS – pooled OLS regressions. FE – country fixed effects estimation. * (**, ***) significant at 
the 10 (5, 1) percent level. In order to avoid endogeneity problems, one and two period lags 
have been used to instrument EU integration, NATO, Aid, and Liberalization.  
Definition of Variables: EU-Integration: time varying variable measuring the degree of integration with 
the EU on a basis of agreements as PCA, SAA, ENP AP for non-EU members or Cooperation 
Agreements, membership notices (the Declarations of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 for 
Central and East European countries or of the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 for Western 
Balkans) and the accession negotiations (the beginning and the end) for the new EU members. 
The variable runs from 0 = no agreements to 5 = membership. EU-Potential: time-invariant 
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dummy; equals 1 for all countries except Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. NATO: 
dummy variable equals 1 for all years following a NATO Membership Action Plan. WESTERN: 
variable equals 1 if protestant or catholic Christianity dominates in a particular country, 
otherwise it equals 0. AID: official Development Assistance and Official Aid (share of GDP), 
taken as an average over current and past two years. LIBERALISATION: average of indices 
of price liberalization and trade and foreign exchange liberalization, running from 1 (lowest) 
to 4,66 (highest). TENSIONS: binary variable quals1 if there was a conflict in the first year of 
transition and equals 0 if there was not any conflict. 
Sources: EU Agreements Database (http://europa.eu/abc/history/1990-1999/index_en.htm; own 
summary); NATO (www.nato.int; own summary); CIA World Factbook Online (https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook); EBRD, World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank; Database on Conflicts of Heidelberg Institute für International Conflict Re-
search (www.hiik.de; own summary); World Bank Development Indicators 2008.
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